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Finite-Time Model-Learning Based L1-Simplex For
Integrated TCS and ABS
Yanbing Mao, Naira Hovakimyan, Petros Voulgaris, and Lui Sha
Abstract—This paper proposes an L1-Simplex architecture
with finite-time model learning to address safe autonomous
velocity regulation for vehicles driving in dynamic and unforeseen
environments. To guarantee the reliability of autonomous vehi-
cles, an L1 adaptive controller, which compensates for uncertain-
ties and disturbances, is employed by the Simplex architecture
as a verified safe controller to tolerate concurrent software
and physical failures. Meanwhile, safe switching controller is
incorporated into Simplex to achieve the safe velocity tracking
through integration of the traction control system (TCS) and
anti-lock braking system (ABS). Specifically, the vehicle’s velocity
asymptotically tracks its provided references that vary with
driving environments, while restricts its wheel slip to safe sets
to prevent slipping and sliding. Due to the high dependence of
the vehicle dynamics on the operational environment, Simplex
leverages finite-time model learning to timely learn and update
the vehicle model for L1 adaptive controller, when any devi-
ation from the safety envelope or the uncertainty measurement
threshold occurs in unforeseen driving environments. Simulations
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed L1-Simplex with
model learning in different scenarios.
Index Terms—L1-Simplex, L1 adaptive control, finite-time
model learning, traction control system, anti-lock braking system.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTELLIGENT transportation systems (ITS) that embedvehicles, roads, traffic lights, message signs, along with
microchips and sensors are bringing significant improvements
in transportation system performance, including reduced con-
gestion, increased safety and traveler convenience [1]. Intel-
ligent vehicles that aim to improve traffic safety, transport
efficiency and driving comfort are playing a major role in
ITS, among which the longitudinal vehicle dynamics control
is an important aspect. Traction control system (TCS) and anti-
lock braking system (ABS) are representative technologies for
longitudinal vehicle dynamic control systems [2]. Specifically,
ABS is primarily designed to prevent excessive or insufficient
wheel slip to keep vehicle steerable and stable during intense
braking events, which contributes to high brake performance
and road safety [3]–[5], while TCS primarily regulates wheel
slip to reduce or eliminate excessive slipping or sliding during
vehicle acceleration, which results in better drivability, safety
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and traction performance in adverse weather or traffic condi-
tions [6]–[10]. Both TCS and ABS are complicated by non-
linearities, uncertainties and parameter variations, which are
induced by variations in the disc-pad friction coefficient [11],
nonlinear relation between brake torque and pressure [11],
nonlinear wheel-slip characteristics [7], among many others.
To regulate slip in these challenging scenarios, various model-
based control schemes have been proposed, e.g., proportional-
integral-derivative control in combination with sliding mode
observer [12], fuzzy control [13], model predictive control
[6], sliding mode control [14], H∞ control [15] and the
comparisons therein for an excellent overview.
Autonomous velocity regulation has gained a vital impor-
tance [16]–[18], which is motivated by, for example, the
imposed speed limits on driving zones (see e.g., school zone
and commercial street) and required relative positions with
respect to surrounding vehicles and obstacles for safety and
transport efficiency. Velocity regulation needs the vehicle to
operate in either drive or brake mode. However, it ignores
the wheel slip regulation [16]–[18], which has always been a
common control objective of TCS and ABS. This implies that
simultaneous velocity and slip regulations need the integration
of TCS and ABS for enhanced safety, drivability, stability
and steerability [3]–[10]. Inspired by these observations, this
paper focuses on safe autonomous velocity regulation. More
concretely, the vehicle asymptotically steers its velocity to
the provided references that depend on driving environments,
while restricts its wheel slip to safe sets to prevent slipping
and sliding during intense braking and accelerating events.
As a typical cyber-physical system, autonomous vehicles in-
tegrate the vehicular cyber system with the vehicular physical
system for control and operation, whose increasing complexity
hinders its reliability, especially when system failures occur.
The Simplex architecture provides a reliable control system
via software approach, whose core idea is to tolerate some
software failures [19]. For the autonomous vehicle, its com-
plicated control missions, see e.g., traction control, lane keep-
ing, collision avoidance, adaptive cruise control and parallel
parking, exacerbate the difficulty of keeping the system safe in
the presence of physical failures, since the control actuation
computed in cyber layer depends on the physical modeling.
In addition, the inaccurate vehicle and/or tire parameters are
the main obstacles for preventing wheel slip-based control
in TCS and ABS. Therefore, the Simplex architecture needs
an adaptive controller (which can compensate for model and
parameter uncertainties) as a verified safe controller to tolerate
physical failures as well. Among the various adaptive control
methods, L1 adaptive controller has been widely adopted due
2to its fast adaptation, guaranteed robustness, and predictable
transient response [20], [21]. Considering that L1 adaptive
control has been verified consistently with the theory in
dealing with physical failures with transient performance and
robustness guarantees [22]–[24], Wang et al. in [25] proposed
a L1-Simplex to address concurrent software and physical
failures. Inspired by the attractive properties of L1-Simplex,
this paper considers its variant in autonomous vehicles for
safe autonomous velocity regulation, where L1 adaptive con-
trol works as a verified safe controller that compensates for
uncertainties, disturbances, software and physical failures.
One of the fundamental assumptions of model-based con-
trollers is the availability of a good model of the underlying
dynamics in consideration. However, vehicle dynamics highly
depend on the driving environments [6], [7], and can be
significantly different from one road (e.g., asphalt) to another
(e.g., snow). Therefore, a single off-line-built vehicle model
cannot capture the dynamics differences induced by envi-
ronmental variations. To address the model mismatch issue,
we bring switching control scheme into L1-Simplex, where
multiple normal vehicle models that correspond to different
environments (e.g., snow and icy) are stored in L1 adaptive
control architecture. The objective of switching L1 adaptive
controller is to achieve safe autonomous velocity regulation in
dynamic normal driving environments.
Due to the high dependence of vehicle dynamics on driving
environments (including air mass density, wind velocity and
road friction coefficient, [26]), it is unreasonable to expect that
the off-line-built multiple models are sufficient to accurately
describe the vehicle-environment interaction dynamics in an
unforeseen or unprepared environment, as e.g. the 2019 New
York City Snow Squall [27]. If the unforeseen environments
cause deviation from the safety envelope or the uncertainty
measurement threshold in the time-critical environment, it is
necessary to use limited sensor data to timely learn and update
the vehicle model for reliable decision making. In recent
several years, significant effort has been devoted towards the
sample complexity bound of ordinary least-square based finite-
time model learning [28]–[32], including lower bounds on
model error and the upper bounds on the number of observa-
tions sufficient to identify system model with prescribed levels
of accuracy and confidence. The sample complexity bounds
obtained therein rely on the assumption that the discretization
of real systems can be described by x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +
f(k + 1), where x(k) and f(k) denote state observations
and random bias, respectively. Even more importantly, the
bias process {f(k)}∞k=1 drawn independently is assumed to
have zero-mean, unit-variance, independent coordinates, which
prevents the applications of the obtained results in [28]–[32]
to fairly general systems that have dependence structures, i.e,
the random vector f(k) has dependencies on time k and/or
coordinates. To remove the obstacles that prevent learning
dynamical systems with dependence structures, we proposed
a novel finite-time model learning with complexity bounds in
[33], which will be used to timely learn and update a vehicle
model for L1-Simplex in unforeseen driving environments.
To this end, we propose a L1-Simplex architecture with
safe switching control and finite-time model learning for
autonomous vehicles, which is able to achieve
• safe autonomous velocity regulation in dynamic and
unforeseen driving environments;
• tolerance of concurrent software and physical failures.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the preliminaries including longitudinal vehicle model and
model-learning based L1-Simplex architecture. Safety enve-
lope is formulated in Section III. In Section IV, we present
the off-line-built ideal vehicle model and finite-time model
learning procedure. We investigate the safe switching control
of off-line-built models and inferred model via model learning
in Section V, building on which Section VI presents L1-
Simplex design. We present numerical simulations in Section
VII. We finally present our conclusions and future research
directions in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We let R2 denote the set of two dimensional real vectors.
R2×2 denotes the set of 2 × 2-dimensional real matrices. N
stands for the set of natural numbers, and N0 = N∪{0}. V\K
stands for the complement set of K with respect to V. I and
1, respectively, denote the identity matrix and vectors of all
ones with proper dimensions. For x ∈ R2, ‖x‖ =
√
x21 + x
2
2.
For A ∈ R2×2, ‖A‖ denotes the induced 2-norm of a matrix
A. The superscript ‘⊤’ stands for matrix transpose. We use
P > (<) 0 to denote a positive definite (negative definite)
matrix P . Given a symmetric matrix P , λmin(P ) and λmax(P )
are the minimum and maximum eigenvalues, respectively.
L1 norm of a function x(t) is denoted by ‖x(t)‖L1 , and‖x‖L∞[a,b] = supa≤t≤b ‖x(t)‖. We denote x(s) = L {x(t)},
where L(·) stands for the Laplace transform operator. The
gradient of f(x) at x is denoted by ∇f(x). The parameter
notations of vehicle model are given in Table I.
Table I
VEHICLE MODEL PARAMETERS
w Angular velocity
v Longitudinal velocity
J Wheel rotational inertia
Tb Brake torque
Tc Friction torque on wheel
Te Engine torque
Tw Viscous torque on wheel
Fa Longitudinal aerodynamic drag force
Ff Longitudinal tire force
λ Longitudinal slip
µ Longitudinal friction coefficient
ζ Aerodynamic drag constant
̺ Viscous friction in driven wheel
P Master cylinder pressure
r Wheel radius
m Vehicle mass
l Wheel base length
lr distance from gravity center to rear wheel
g Gravity acceleration
h Gravity center height
3Figure 1. Front-wheel-driven vehicle model.
B. Vehicle Model
The longitudinal vehicle model is depicted in Figure 1,
whose control variables are engine torque and master cylinder
pressure, respectively. We make the following assumption on
the vehicle’s model throughout this paper.
Assumption 1: The vehicle’s
1) dynamics of the left and the right sides are identical (i.e.
the vehicle is symmetric);
2) wheel is damped with a viscous torque [34], i.e.,
Tw(t) = ̺w(t); (1)
3) longitudinal aerodynamic drag force can be linearized in
terms of longitudinal velocity [34], i.e.,
Fa(t) = ζv(t). (2)
The uncertainties pertaining to the relations (1) and (2) are
included in the following dynamics of the vehicle’s longitudi-
nal and wheel motions on a flat road, [26]:
Jw˙(t) = Te(t)− Tw(t)− Tb(t)− Tc(t) + f˜w(t), (3a)
mv˙(t) =
Tc(t)
r
− Fa(t) + f˜v(t), (3b)
where f˜w(t) and f˜v(t) represent uncertainties that are
due to the modeling errors, noise, disturbances, unmodeled
forces/torques in (1), (2), and others.
Following [11], the actual relation between the master
cylinder pressure and the brake torque is modeled by a linear
model with uncertainty:
Tb(t) = CηbrbP (t) +̟b(t), (4)
where C, ηb and rb denote the known brake piston effective
area, pad friction coefficient and brake disc effective radii,
respectively; and the unknown ̟b(t) denotes the uncertainty.
The wheel slip defined in term of wheel and longitudinal
velocities as
s ,
{
v − wr, if v ≥ wr
wr − v, if v < wr (5)
is the control objective of TCS [6]. We note that s = 0
and s = max {v, wr} indicate pure rolling and full sliding,
respectively. In this paper, the slip will be imposed on velocity
tracking control as a safety constraint.
We now define a set of driving environment indices:
E , {dry,wet, snow, . . . , icy}, U , E ∪ {learned}. (6)
Remark 1: E is regarded as the set of normal environments,
whose elements have the corresponding off-line-built vehicle
models, while the element ‘learned’ in U denotes the unfore-
seen driving environment, whose corresponding vehicle model
needs to be learnt from limited velocity sensor data.
The experimental data of tire friction models shows that
the tire friction torque depends on slip (or slip ratio) and
road friction coefficient [6], [7]. We also use a linear model
with uncertainty to describe the actual relation between the
tire friction torque, slip and road friction coefficient, i.e.,
Tc(t) = kσ(t)s(t) + ̟c(t), where kσ(t) is obtained from
experimental data via parameter identification, ̟c(t) denotes
the unknown uncertainty, and σ(t) ∈ E, where, e.g., σ(t) =
‘snow‘ for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) means the vehicle is driving in the
snow environment during the time interval [tk, tk+1). With the
consideration of (5), Tc(t) is equivalently expressed as
Tc(t) =
{
(v(t)r − w(t))kσ(t) +̟c(t), if v(t) ≥ w(t)r
(w(t) − v(t)r )kσ(t) +̟c(t), if v(t) < w(t)r
substituting which together with (1), (2) and (4) into (3) yields
a vehicle model with uncertainties:
• if v(t) ≥ w(t)r,
w˙(t) =
kσ(t)−̺
J
w(t)− kσ(t)
Jr
v(t)+u(t)+fw(t), (7a)
v˙(t) = −kσ(t)
mr
w(t)+
kσ(t)−ζr2
mr2
v(t)+fv(t); (7b)
• if v(t) < w(t)r,
w˙(t) = −kσ(t)+̺
J
w(t)+
kσ(t)
Jr
v(t)+u(t)+fw(t), (8a)
v˙(t) =
kσ(t)
mr
w(t)− kσ(t)+ζr
2
mr2
v(t)+fv(t); (8b)
where u(t) denotes control input (u(t) > 0 and u(t) < 0
indicate activated drive and brake models, respectively), and
u(t)=
Te(t)−CηbrbP (t)
J
, fv(t)=
̟c(t)+rf˜v(t)
mr
,
fw(t)=−̟c(t)+̟b(t)+f˜w(t)
J
.
C. Variant L1-Simplex Architecture
This subsection introduces the proposed L1Simplex archi-
tecture with incorporation of switching control and finite-time
model learning, which is adopted from [25]. As described by
Figures 2 and 3, the proposed L1-Simplex architecture for
autonomous vehicles includes
• High-Performance Controller (HPC) (Figure 2): The HPC
is a complex controller for the autonomous vehicle,
which provides high levels of performance and advanced
functionalities, and is active during normal operation of
the system, due to which, it may not be fully verified.
4• L1-Based Robust High-Assurance Controller (RHAC)
(Figures 2 and 3): The HAC is a simple and verified
controller that provides limited levels of performance
and reduced functionalities to guarantee safe and stable
operation of the vehicle. As highlighted in Figure 3, the
latest version includes
– stored off-line-built vehicle models that vary with
environment, which guarantee safe autonomous ve-
locity regulation in dynamic normal driving environ-
ments;
– finite-time model learning, which timely learns and
updates the vehicle model for safe autonomous ve-
locity regulation in unforeseen driving environments;
– switching logic that depends on driving environment
detection and real-time verification of the safety
envelope, which is responsible for activating an off-
line-built model or finite-time model learning for L1
adaptive controller.
• Uncertainty Monitor (Figure 2): This verified monitor
takes the form of the state predictor in L1 adaptive control
architecture, which provides estimates of the uncertainties
inside the vehicle system with fast adaptation.
• Decision Logic (Figure 2): This verified logic depends on
the magnitudes of uncertainty estimations and safety en-
velope, which triggers the switching from HPC to RHAC
in the event of software and/or physical failures. Its real-
time verification of the safety envelope and uncertainty
measurement are also the input of the switching logic in
RHAC (Figure 3) that activates stored vehicle models or
model learning.
Figure 2. L1-Simplex architecture.
Remark 2: In L1-Simplex architecture, finite-time model
learning is running in parallel with RHAC and HPC, which
is depicted in Figure 3. This configuration guarantees when
model learning is needed for reliable decision making, an in-
ferred model is available immediately, so that RHAC is always
in control. Without the configuration of parallel running, the
car can lose control in unforeseen environment, which is due
to the time delay in obtaining the inferred vehicle model from
model learning and then the updating safe controllers.
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the proposed L1Simplex
includes three types of switching: 1) switching between HPC
and RHAC, 2) switching between stored vehicle models and
inferred vehicle from model learning, and 3) switching be-
tween two subsystems in a fixed environment. To exclude Zeno
behaviors in switching logic, we impose a minimum dwell
Figure 3. L1-based RHAC architecture with switching control and finite-time
model learning.
time on HPC, RHAC, learned vehicle models and stored sub-
models, i.e.,
min
∀k∈N0
{tk+1 − tk} ≥ dwellmin > 0, (9)
where tk denotes the switching time.
Remark 3: The reliable environmental perception is the key
to the fast and accurate detection of driving environments,
which however is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we make a corresponding assumption on the capability of
intelligent vehicle.
Assumption 2: The vehicle is equipped with sensors for real-
time environmental perception, which can accurately detect the
driving environments.
The proposed L1-Simplex with switching control and finite-
time model learning has two safe control objectives, which are
formally stated below.
• Safe Control Objective I: the vehicle asymptotically
steers its velocity to the provided varying references,
while restricts its wheel slips to allowable safe sets in
dynamic and unforeseen driving environments.
• Safe Control Objective II: the vehicle control system
tolerates the concurrent software and physical failures.
This paper mainly focuses on L1-based RHAC, since the
two safe control objectives are primarily achieved by the
RHAC. In the following, we will first present the formula of
safety envelope pertaining to wheel slip. We then present the
off-line-built vehicle models and inferred vehicle model via
model learning, and the corresponding safe switching control,
which will pave the way to RHAC design.
III. SAFETY ENVELOPES
This paper considers velocity regulation via tracking the
provided references in two different scenarios that are
• Varying velocity references with respect to normal driving
environments, i.e.,
∃σ, ǫ ∈ E, vrσ 6= vrǫ and wrσ 6= wrǫ (10)
• Zero velocity reference in unforeseen driving environ-
ments, i.e.,
σ = learned, vrσ = w
r
σ = 0, (11)
5where vrσ and w
r
σ , respectively, denote the longitudinal and
angular velocity references for driving environment σ ∈ U,
and U and E are given in (6).
Remark 4: In the unforeseen driving environments, see e.g.,
2019 New York City Snow Squall [27], the possible sudden
slick conditions on roadways, rapidly reduced visibility, un-
forecast adverse weather conditions, etc., can lead to high
speed wrecks, pile ups, and subsequently injuries and fatalities.
The safety strategy for autonomous vehicles driving in these
environments should be safe parking on a road side, rather
than continuous driving, which is the motivation behind the
zero velocity reference in unforeseen environments.
For Safe Control Objective I, the provided velocity refer-
ences are required to satisfy the following condition:
v
r
σ − rwrσ −
ζr2vrσ
kσ
= 0, vrσ ≥ rwrσ, σ ∈ U (12a)
rwrσ − vrσ −
ζr2vrσ
kσ
= 0, vrσ < rw
r
σ, σ ∈ U, (12b)
based on which we define the tracking error vector:
e⊤(t) , [ew(t), ev(t)] = [w(t), v(t)] − [wrσ(t),vrσ(t)]. (13)
Remark 5: The relation (12) indicates that the desired slip
is sr = vrσ − rwrσ = ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
, which depends on driving
environment indexed by σ. Instead of regulating the wheel
slip to the desired sr, we are interested in restricting the slip
to a safety set, which will be a constraint condition for safe
control design.
In addition to velocity regulation for collision avoidance,
lane keeping, and other constraints, the wheel slip s (defined
in (5)) should be below a safety boundary (which varies with
driving environment) to prevent slipping and sliding, i.e.,
s = |wr − v| ≤ µσ. (14)
Substituting (12) into (14) yields
|wr − v| =
∣∣∣∣wr − v −wrσr + vrσ + ζr2vrσkσ
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ev−ewr− ζr2vrσkσ
∣∣∣∣≤µσ, vrσ<rwrσ, σ ∈ U
(15)
|wr − v| =
∣∣∣∣v − wr − vrσ + rwrσ + ζr2vrσkσ
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ev−ewr+ ζr2vrσkσ
∣∣∣∣≤µσ, vrσ≥rwrσ, σ∈U (16)
which are equivalently expressed as
• if vrσ ≥ wrσr,
−µσ − ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
≤ ev − ewr ≤ µσ − ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
; (17)
• if vrσ < v
r
σr,
−µσ + ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
≤ ev − ewr ≤ µσ + ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
. (18)
Based on (17) and (18), we define a set of vectors:
cˆσ ,
[
rkσ
ζr2vrσ − µσkσ
,
kσ
µσkσ − ζr2vrσ
]⊤
, (19)
by which we obtain the following lemma regarding safety
formula, whose proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1: Consider the vector (19). The safety condition
(14) holds if
−1 ≤ cˆ⊤σ e ≤ 1, (20)
where e and cˆ are defined in (13) and (19), respectively.
Building on (20), safety constraint set for ideal vehicle
models is defined as follows:
Ωσ ,
{
e ∈ R2
∣∣ c⊤σ e ≤ 1} , σ ∈ U, (21)
where we define
c⊤σ ,
{
cˆσ, if v ≥ wr
−cˆσ, if v < wr.
(22)
In addition, we define the following invariant sets and bound-
ary sets, which will be used to determine the safety envelopes:
Φσ ,
{
e ∈ R2∣∣ e⊤P¯σe ≤ 1} , σ ∈ U (23)
∂Φσ ,
{
e ∈ Rn| e⊤P¯σe = 1
}
, σ ∈ U, (24)
where
P¯σ =
[
p¯σ1 p¯
σ
2
p¯σ2 p¯
σ
3
]
> 0. (25)
The following lemma provides a condition under which Φσ
is a subset of safety set Ωσ , which will be used for safe
autonomous velocity regulation.
Lemma 2: Consider the safety sets (21) and (23). Φσ ⊆ Ωσ
holds if and only if cˆ⊤σ P¯
−1
σ cˆσ ≤ 1, σ ∈ U.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify from (22) that
c⊤σ P¯
−1
σ cσ = cˆ
⊤
σ P¯
−1
σ cˆσ . Then, the rest of the proof is the same
as that of Lemma 4.1 in [35]; here it is omitted.
Building on Lemma 2, the safety invariant set (23) and the
safety boundary set (24), we present the safety envelopes for
vehicles driving in different environments:
Θσ , {e∈R2
∣∣ e⊤P¯
σ
e≤θ and min
y∈∂Φσ
‖e− y‖≥ε}, (26)
where θ < 1 and ε < 1.
IV. VEHICLE MODEL REFERENCES
As shown in Figure 3, L1-based RHAC needs to store
several off-line-built vehicle model references that correspond
to different environments, as well as the learned model model
reference from finite-model leaning in an unforeseen driving
environment, for state predictor and baseline controllers de-
sign. We note from (7) and (8) that real vehicle models under
each fixed road σ ∈ E have two subsystems that are determined
by internal state-dependent switching rules, i.e., v(t) ≥ w(t)r
and v(t) < w(t)r. We now define a set of overall switching
indices:
S,
{
hpc, learned, dry1, dry2,wet1,wet2, . . . , icy1, icy2
}
, (27)
where ‘learned’ denotes the learned model reference in an
unforeseen environment, ‘hpc’ denoted the vehicle system
under the control from HPC, ‘icy1’ and ‘icy2’ denote the
vehicle models under the conditions of v(t) ≥ w(t)r and
v(t) < w(t)r in the ice environment, respectively.
6A. Off-Line-Built Vehicle Model References
The off-line-built model references are straightforwardly ob-
tained from (7) and (8) via dropping uncertainties as follows:
• if v(t) ≥ w(t)r,
˙¯w(t) =
kσ(t) − ̺
J
w¯(t)− kσ(t)
Jr
v¯(t) + u¯(t), (28a)
˙¯v(t) = −kσ(t)
mr
w¯(t) +
kσ(t) − ζr2
mr2
v¯(t); (28b)
• if v(t) < w(t)r,
˙¯w(t) = −kσ(t) + ̺
J
w¯(t) +
kσ(t)
Jr
v¯(t) + u¯(t), (29a)
˙¯v(t) =
kσ(t)
mr
w¯(t)− kσ(t) + ζr
2
mr2
v¯(t). (29b)
We now define:
x, [w, v]
⊤
, x¯, [w¯, v¯]
⊤
, f0 , [fw, fv]
⊤
, B, [1, 0]
⊤
, (30a)
Aσ1 ,
[
kσ(t)−̺
J −
kσ(t)
Jr
− kσmr
kσ(t)−ζr
2
mr2
]
, Aσ2 ,
[
−kσ(t)+̺J kσJr
kσ
mr
−kσ(t)−ζr
2
mr2
]
. (30b)
With these definitions at hand, the real vehicle dynamics
described by (7) and (8), and the vehicle model reference
described by (28) and (29) are, respectively, rewritten as
x˙(t) = Aσ˜(t)x(t) +Bu(t) + f0(x, t), σ˜(t) ∈ S (31)
˙¯x(t) = Aσ˜(t)x¯(t) +Bu¯(t), σ˜(t) ∈ S/{hpc,learned}, (32)
where S is given in (27), x¯(t0) = x(t0) with t0 denoting the
initial time. The definition (27), in conjunction with (6), shows
that the relation between σ˜(t) and σ(t) can be described by
For σ˜(t)∈S/{hpc,learned}, σ˜(t)=σi(t), i∈{1, 2}, σ(t)∈E. (33)
Remark 6: We handle the unmodeled forces/torques, e.g.,
rolling resistance forces, as uncertainties, which will be com-
pensated by L1 adaptive controller in RHAC.
B. Finite-Time Model Learning
1) Model Learning Procedure: The unknown and unmea-
sured environmental characteristics can potentially lead to
large mismatch between the off-line-built vehicle-environment
interaction model references and real vehicle behaviors in
unforeseen environments. Subsequently, the control action
cannot be reliable. This motivates to employ finite-time model
learning to infer a vehicle model reference using limited sensor
data generated in the unforeseen environment. When model
learning is triggered, RHAC transforms to a model-learning
based control, whose framework is briefly described in Figure
4. Since control input matrix B given in (30a) does not include
any vehicle parameters, learning a system matrix is sufficient
for L1-based RHAC.
The data sampling technique transforms the continuous-time
dynamics to be discrete-time. The discretization of real system
(31) is thus obtained as
x (p+1) =
(
I+TAσ˜(p)
)
x (p)+TBu (p)+Tf0(x, p), (34)
Figure 4. Finite-time model-learning based control architecture.
where p ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . , k +m}, with T being the sampling
period, and
k =
t− κ
T
, m =
κ
T
, (35)
such that kT = t− κ and (k +m)T = t.
Following the learning procedure developed [33], the finite-
time model learning algorithm is introduced as:
(I+ TAlearned) P¯ = Q¯+ R¯, (36)
where we define
P¯ ,
k+m−2∑
p=k
(x(p) − x(p+1))(x(p) − x(p+1))⊤, (37)
Q¯ ,
k+m−2∑
p=k
(x(p+1)− x(p+2))(x(p) − x(p+1))⊤, (38)
R¯ ,
k+m−2∑
p=k
TB(u(p)− u(p− 1))(x(p) − x(p+ 1))⊤. (39)
From the discrete-time computation (36), we in turn obtain
the continuous-time vehicle model reference:
˙¯x(t) = Alearnedx¯(t) +Bu¯(t), (40a)
Alearned =
1
T
((
Q¯+ R¯
)
P¯−1 − I) . (40b)
Remark 7 (Unforeseen Environmental Data): The switching
logic pertaining to learned model reference, which is formally
presented in Section VI, depends on environmental perception
and real-time verification of the safety envelope and uncer-
tainty measurement. Specifically, if the perception detects the
occurrence of unforeseen environment, but the vehicle’s real-
time state does not deviate from the safety envelope and
the magnitude of uncertainty measurement does not exceed
a preset threshold, the learned model reference will not be
activated. This switching logic implies that the recorded data
x(s), s ∈ [t − κ, t], for the learned model reference activated
at current time t, already includes the sensor data generated
in the unforeseen environment.
Remark 8 (Parallel Running): As shown in Figure 4 or the
relation (35), the HPC, RHAC and finite-time model learning
are running in parallel, such that once the model learning
solution is needed, an inferred matrix Alearned is available
immediately for safety controller updating.
72) Sample Complexity Bounds, Sampling Period and Ob-
servation Horizon: The sample complexity bounds on model
learning procedure (36) when TBu (p)+Tf0(x, p) in (34) can
be modeled by a random vector are derived in [33]. It includes
the upper bounds on the number of observations sufficient
to identify system matrix with prescribed levels of accuracy
and confidence. As indicated by (35), this upper bound can
be achieved through adjustment of the sampling period T .
To review the influence of sampling period T on the sample
complexity bounds, let us consider a simplified discrete system
that can represent (34) at some extent:
x(p+ 1) = Ax(p) + f(p), (41a)
r(p) = x(p) +w(p), p ∈ N (41b)
where f(p) and w(p), respectively, denote the process and
observation noise.
The learned matrix that follows learning procedure (36) for
the system (41) updates as
Aι = Q̂P̂
−1 (42a)
P̂ =
k+m−2∑
p=k
(r(p)− r(p− 1)) (r(p)− r(p− 1))⊤ (42b)
Q̂ =
k+m−2∑
p=k
(r(p+ 1)− r(p)) (r(p)− r(p− 1))⊤ (42c)
We can obtain the dynamics of noisy observation from the
real system (41):
r(p)=Ar(p−1)+h(p), r(1)=x(1)+w(1), p≥ 2 ∈N. (43)
where
h(p) , f(p− 1) +w(p)−Aw(p− 1), p ≥ 2 ∈ N. (44)
Remark 9: We have proved in [33] that compared with
ordinary least-square estimator, the proposed learning proce-
dure (42) has smaller estimation error of system matrix when
the observation noise has non-zero mean, and compared with
naive least-square estimator, the inference feasibility of (42)
is more robust to observation-starting time and data length.
However, the recently derived sample complexity bounds for
ordinary least-square estimator in [28]–[32] do not hold for
the procedure (42), which can be explained by the following
observations:
• even assuming both f(p) and w(p) are drawn indepen-
dently and have independent coordinates, due to Aw(k−
1), the processed random vector h(p) has dependencies
on coordinates and time;
• the obtained sample complexity bounds in [28]–[31]
rely on the assumption that h(p) has independence on
coordinates and time.
Through leveraging the variant Hanson-Wright inequality
for random vectors with dependencies, we derived the sample
complexity bounds on (42), which is formally presented in the
following theorem. We refer reader to [33] for its assumption
and parameter notations.
Theorem 1: [33] Consider the system (43) and learned
matrix in (42). For any 0 < δ¯ < 1, and any φ¯ > 0, we
have: P(||A − Aι|| ≤ φ¯) ≥ 1 − δ¯, as long as the following
conditions hold
min
{
ρ¯2
4||C−0.5v ||4F||Cv||
,
ρ¯
2||C−0.5v ||2F
}
≥ γ¯
2
2
ln
4 · 9n
δ¯
, (45)
λmin(Υ(k,m)) ≥
16γ¯2
(1−ρ¯)φ¯2 ln
(√
2 · 5n
δ¯
(
1−ρ¯
10
)0.5n)
, (46)
where 0 < ρ < 1, and
Υ(k,m)=(2σ
2
o¯+σ
2
p¯)mI+
k+m−1∑
p=k
p−3∑
i=0
Ai(I−A)(I−A)⊤(Ai)⊤σ2p¯.
Remark 10: As indicated by the conditions (45) and (46), a
rough upper bound on number of observations can be obtained
as
mup =
16γ¯2
(1−ρ¯)φ¯2(2σ¯2o¯+σ¯2p¯)
ln
(√
2 · 5n
δ¯
(
1−ρ¯
10
)0.5n)
,
such that (46) holds for any m ≥ mup. Under the constraint
(45), the lower bound on model error φ¯ can also be implicitly
estimated from (46) through
φ¯2lo =
16γ¯2
(1−ρ¯)λ¯min(Υ(m,l))
ln
(√
2 · 5n
δ¯
(
1−ρ¯
10
)0.5n)
.
If Tf0(x, p) in (34) can be modeled by the random vector
under the imposed assumption in [33], the complexity bounds
can be applied to the model learning procedure (36) to for
optimal sampling time period T and observation horizon κ
for the prescribed levels of accuracy and confidence, since
the number of observations m is determined by the sampling
period and the horizon, which is implied by (35).
Remark 11: If Tf0(x, p) in (34) cannot be modeled by the
random vector in [33], the obtained complexity bounds may
not be applicable to (40). The learned system matrix can still
be used by L1-Simplex, since L1 adaptive controller compen-
sates for the identification error included in uncertainties.
V. SAFE SWITCHING CONTROL
This section investigates safe switching control of off-line-
built and learned vehicle model references. We now define the
tracking error vector for model references:
e¯⊤ , [e¯w, e¯v] = [w¯, v¯]− [wrσ,vrσ]. (47)
The velocity tracking control for the off-line-built model
reference (32) and finite-time learned model reference (40)
is given as follows:
u¯=
{
−Fwσ˜ e¯w−F vσ˜ e¯v+ ζrv
r
σ+̺w
r
σ
J , σ˜∈S/{hpc,learned}
−Fwσ˜ w¯−F vσ˜ v¯=−Fwσ˜ e¯w−F vσ˜ e¯v, σ˜∈{learned}
, (48)
where S is given in (27), Fwσ˜ and F
v
σ˜ are the designed control
gains.
In the following, we start from a simple case of identical
velocity reference that includes (11), i.e.,
∀σ ∈ U, vrσ = vr and wrσ = wr. (49)
We then extend the results to the more general case (10).
8A. Identical Velocity Reference
1) Stabilization: Substituting (12) under the constraint (49)
into the models (32) and (40) with the control input (48) leads
to the dynamics of tracking error (47):
˙¯e(t) = Âσ˜(t)e¯(t), σ˜(t) ∈ S/{hpc}, (50)
where S is given in (27), and
Âσ1 =
[
kσ
J − ̺J − Fwσ1 −kσrJ − F vσ1
− kσmr kσ−ζr
2
mr2
]
, σ ∈ E (51)
Âσ2 =
[
−kσJ − ̺J − Fwσ2 kσrJ − F vσ2
kσ
mr
−kσ−ζr
2
mr2
]
, σ ∈ E (52)
Âlearned = Alearned −B[Fwlearned, F vlearned], (53)
with E defined in (6). The following theorem, whose proof
appears in Appendix B, presents the stability of off-line-built
system matrices.
Theorem 2: Consider the system matrices (51) and (52).
• The matrix Âσ1 is Hurwitz if and only if
Fwσ1 >
kσ − ̺
J
− kσ
mr2
− ζ
m
, (54a)
F vσ1 < −
̺
rJ
+
ζr2 − kσ
rkσ
Fwσ1 −
(kσ − ̺)ζr
kσJ
. (54b)
• The matrix Âσ2 is Hurwitz if and only if
Fwσ2 > −
kσ
J
− ̺
J
− kσ
mr2
− ζ
m
, (55a)
F vσ2 > −
̺
rJ
− ζr
2 + kσ
rkσ
Fwσ2 −
(kσ + ̺)ζr
kσJ
. (55b)
Remark 12: When the aerodynamic drag force is ignored
as studied in [6], the conditions (54) and (55) imply that if
Fwσ1 = F
w
σ2 , we have F
v
σ1 6= F vσ2 , which means the identical
control scheme (i.e., Fwσ1 = F
w
σ2 and F
v
σ1 = F
v
σ2 ) cannot
simultaneously stabilize the two subsystems driven by the
switching conditions v ≥ wr and v < wr (i.e., ˙¯e(t) = Âσ1 e¯(t)
and ˙¯e(t) = Âσ2 e¯(t)).
We note that there exists a class of switched systems, such
that even when all of its subsystems are stable, the system
can still be unstable if its switching time is not reasonable
[36]. In the following lemma, whose proof is presented in
Appendix C, we investigate whether this scenario can happen
when the vehicle drives in a fixed environment. The answer
will contribute to safe switching control design.
Lemma 3: For a fixed σ ∈ E, if the control gains in
the system matrices (51) and (52) satisfy (54) and (55),
respectively, there exists a common P¯σ > 0 such that
Â⊤σi P¯σ + P¯σÂσi < 0, ∀i = 1, 2. (56)
Remark 13: It directly follows from Theorem 3.4 of [36]
that the switching time does not undermine the stability of
ideal model (50) for a fixed σ ∈ E, i.e., when driving
in a fixed normal environment, under arbitrary switching
(excluding Zeno behaviors) that is triggered by “v ≥ wr”
and “v < wr”, the switched system (50) is always stable.
2) Safe Control: With the consideration of (30b), and (51)–
(53), the dynamics (50) can be equivalently transformed to
˙¯e(t) = (Aσ˜(t) + B̂Fσ˜(t))e¯(t), σ˜(t) ∈ S/{hpc}, (57)
where Aσ˜(t) is given in (30b) and (40b), the control gains are
included in matrix Fσ˜(t), which are to be computed, and
B̂ ,
[
1 1
0 0
]
. (58)
We next present the following LMI formula for obtaining
Fσ˜ and Pσ that guarantee safe autonomous velocity regulation:
Qσ > 0, ∀σ ∈ U (59a)
cˆ⊤σQσ cˆσ ≤ 1, ∀σ ∈ U (59b)
AσiQσ+B̂E˘σi+(AσiQσ+B̂E˘σi)
⊤<0,∀σ∈E, i=1, 2 (59c)
AlearnedQlearned + B̂E˘learned
+ (AlearnedQlearned + B̂E˘learned)
⊤ < 0, (59d)
based on which, we obtain
Fσi = E˘σi P¯σ, Flearned = E˘learnedP¯learned, (60a)
P¯−1σ = Qσ, P¯
−1
learned = Qlearned, i = 1, 2, σ ∈ E, (60b)
where E and U are defined in (6).
One potential benefit of switching control is extending the
safety envelope to Θ =
⋃
σ∈U
Θσ [25]. However, the switching
time is a critical factor in this extension. In other words, if
the dwell times of subsystems are not reasonable, the safety
envelope cannot be extended, which is illustrated by Figure 5:
• Figure 5 (a): at switching time tk+1, the system state
e¯(tk+1) does not fall into Θ2. Consequently, e¯(t) /∈ Θ for
some time, which hinders the safety envelope extension.
• Figure 5 (b): at switching time tk+1, the system state
e¯(tk+1) falls into the safety envelope Θ2, which leads to
Θ2 ⊆ Θ, thus extends the safety envelope.
Figure 5. Phase plots under different scheduling of switching times.
We now define:
A¯σi , Aσi +BFσi , A¯learned , Alearned +BFlearned, (61)
λσmax , max
i∈{1,2}
{λmax(P¯σA¯σi + A¯⊤σi P¯σ)}, (62)
λlearnedmax , λmax(P¯learnedA¯learned + A¯
⊤
learnedP¯learned). (63)
With the definitions at hand, the following theorem presents
the conditions on switching time that guarantee the system
stability and the safety envelope extension simultaneously,
whose proof is given in Appendix D.
9Theorem 3: Consider the switched system (57) and safety
envelopes (26), with Fσ˜ and P¯
−1
σ computed via (59) and (60).
If the minimum dwell time satisfies
dwellmin > max
p6=q∈U
{
λmax(P¯p)
λpmax
ln
λmin(P¯q)
λmax(P¯p)
}
, (64)
the switched system (57) is stable, and e¯(t) ∈ Θ = ⋃
σ∈U
Θσ
for any t ≥ t0 if e¯(t0) ∈ Θσ(t0).
B. Varying Velocity References
Substituting (12) under the constraints (10) and (11) into the
model (32) with the control input (48) leads to the tracking
error dynamics:
˙¯e(t) = (Aσ˜(t) + B̂Fσ˜(t))e¯(t), t ∈ [tk, tk+1) (65a)
e¯(tk) = Ek e¯(t
−
k ), e¯(t
+
0 ) = e¯(t0), (65b)
where Ek is known matrix, Aσ˜(t) and B̂ are given by (30b)
and (58), respectively.
The formula (65b) describes the impulsive effect induced
by the “jumping” velocity reference at switching time. As
illustrated by Figure 6, the impulsive effect has significant in-
fluence on the safety envelope extension, which would impose
high requirement on minimum dwell time, and subsequently,
safe control. The following theorem, whose proof appears in
Appendix E, formally presents the safe control in this scenario.
Figure 6. Impulsive effect on safety envelope: (a) system states escape from
escape from safety envelope, (b) system states stay in safety envelope.
Theorem 4: Consider the switched system (65) and safety
envelopes (26), with Fσ˜ and P¯
−1
σ computed via (59) and (60).
If the minimum dwell time satisfies
dwellmin
> max
k∈N
{
λmax(P¯σ(tk−1))
λ
σ(tk−1)
max
ln
λmin(P¯σ(tk−1))
λmax(E⊤k P¯σ(tk)Ek)
}
, (66)
the switched system (65) is stable, and e¯(t) ∈ Θ for any t ≥ t0
if e¯(t0) ∈ Θσ(t0).
Remark 14 (Extension to Different Road Zones): The pro-
posed safe switching control can be directly extended to the
scenario of a fixed driving environment but different road
zones, see e.g., school zone, commercial street, work zone in
highway, etc. The switching set defined in (27) in this scenario
updates as
S ,
{
hpc, school zone1, school zone2, . . .
}
.
VI. L1-SIMPLEX DESIGN
Sections III–V, respectively, present the safety formula, off-
line-built and learned vehicle model references and their safe
switching control, which have paved the way to the design of
new L1-Simplex.
The dynamics of faulty vehicle system that corresponds to
the real one in (31) operating in HPC is described by
x˙(t) = Ahpcx(t) +Bu(t) + f1(x, t), (67)
where f1(x, t) is an uncertainty function that represents mod-
eling errors, noise, disturbance, unmodeled forces/torques, etc.
The fault dynamics (67) indicates that this paper focuses on the
class of software and physical failures and unmodeled driving
environments, whose influences can be modeled by f1(x, t).
This section studies the critical components in L1-Simplex
architecture, which relies on the following assumption on the
uncertainty.
Assumption 3: The uncertainties fq(x, t) in (31) and (67)
are uniformly bounded in time and Lipschitz in x over safety
set, i.e., there exist positive l and b such that
‖fq(0, t)‖ ≤ bq, (68a)
‖fq(x1, t)− fq(x2, t)‖ ≤ lq ‖x1 − x2‖ , q = 0, 1 (68b)
hold for any t ≥ 0, and x1 − [wrσ,vrσ]⊤, x2 − [wrσ,vrσ]⊤
∈ ⋃
σ∈U
Ωσ , with Ωσ given in (21).
In the following subsections, we present the critical com-
ponents of L1-Simplex in achieving Safe Control Objective
I and Safe Control Objective II simultaneously.
A. Uncertainty Monitor
As shown in Figure 2, the decision logic needs the mea-
surement of uncertainty from the monitor to make the decision
of switching between HPC and RHAC. The dynamics of the
uncertainty monitor of the real car under the control actuator
from HPC is described by
z˙(t) = Azz(t) + (AzBz −BzAhpc)x(t)−BzBu(t), (69a)
f̂(x, t) = Czz(t) + CzBzx(t), (69b)
z(tk) = −Bzx(tk), (69c)
where f̂(x, t) ∈ R2 is a measurement of the uncertainty, and
the triple (Az, Bz , Cz) constitutes a low-pass filter [25].
B. Switching Rules
Building on the safety envelope (26), the uncertainty moni-
tor (69), and the driving environment detection under Assump-
tion 2, the switching rules that describe the decision logic for
HPC and RHAC, and the switching logic for off-line-built
and learned model references are described as below, where
the decision logic is a minor revision of the one in [25].
• Decision Logic: switching from HPC to RHAC
– Rule I: triggered by the magnitude of uncertainty
measurement:∥∥∥f̂(x, t)∥∥∥
>
∫ t
0
∥∥∥CzeAz(t−τ)Bz∥∥∥ (l0 ‖x(τ)‖+ b0) dτ . (70)
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– Rule II: triggered by the safety envelope (26):
e⊤(t)Pσe(t)=θ and e
⊤(t)Pσ e˙(t)>0, ∀σ∈U. (71)
• Switching Logic: switching from off-line-built models to
learned model:
– Rule III: triggered by the uncertainty measurement
(70) and environment detection σ(t) /∈ S.
– Rule IV: triggered by the safety envelope verification
(71) and environment detection σ(t) /∈ S.
Remark 15: It has been proved in [25] that under (68) the
triggering condition in Rule I does not hold, which indicates
that RHAC is activated when the magnitude of uncertainty
measurement exceeds a threshold.
C. L1-Based RHAC
The components of L1-based RHAC shown in Figure 3 are
described in detail as follows.
1) State Predictor: The state predictor of RHAC in Figure
3 is described by
˙˜x(t) = Aσ˜(t)x(t) +Bu(t) + f˜(t)− α(x˜(t)− x(t)), (72a)
x˜(tk∗) = x(tk∗ ), (72b)
where tk∗ is the switching moment from HPC to RHAC, α is
an arbitrary positive scalar, and f˜(t) is the estimation of the
uncertainties f0(x, t) and f1(x, t), which is computed by the
following adaptation law.
2) Adaptation Law: The estimated f˜(t) in (72) is computed
via
˙˜
f(t) = KProjΨ(˜f(t),−(x˜(t)− x(t))), (73)
where K is the adaptive gain, and
Ψ =
f ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣∣∣‖f‖ ≤ ρ = l√min
σ∈U
{λmin(Pσ)}
+ b
 , (74)
with
l = max {l0, l1} , b = max {b0, b1} . (75)
The projection operator ProjΨ : R
2 × R2 → R2 in (73) is
defined as
ProjΨ(p, q)
,
{
q−∇g(p)(∇g(p))⊤qg(p)
‖∇g(p)‖2
, if g(p)>0 and q⊤∇g(p)>0
q, otherwise
(76)
where g(p) = p
⊤p−ρ2+1−ϑ
1−ϑ with ϑ ∈ (1− ρ2, 1). It has been
proved in [25] that the operator (76) can always guarantee
f˜(t) ∈ Ψ.
3) Low-Pass Filter: The low-pass filter that takes f˜(t) as
control input is described by
˙˘x(t) = A˘x˘(t) + B˘ f˜(t), (77a)
uad(t) = C˘x˘(t), x˘(t∗k) = 0 (77b)
where t∗k denotes the switching time when RHAC is activated,
the triple (A˘, B˘, C˘) is the state space realization of an 1 × 2
matrix of low-pass filters that are stable and strictly proper
with the transfer function:
T (s) = C˘(sI− A˘)−1B˘. (78)
4) Control Input of Real Vehicle: As shown in Figure 3,
the control input from RHAC for the real car in dynamic and
unforeseen environments (31) is
u(t) = û(t)− uad(t), (79)
where uad(t) is computed by (77), and
û(t) = Fσ˜(t)e¯(t) +
1
J
[
̺wrσ(t)
ζrvrσ(t)
]
(80)
with Fσ˜(t) given in (60).
D. Performance of L1-Based RHAC
We first define:
Hσ˜(tk)(s) ,
(
sI−Aσ˜(tk) − B̂Fσ˜(tk)
)−1
,
δ ,
e¯⊤(tk∗)Pσ(tk∗ )e¯(tk∗)
λmin(Pσ(tk))
, (81)
ε ,
1
(1− χσ˜(tk))
(∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)BT (s)(s+ α)∥∥L1
√
µ
K
+(δ +
∥∥∥x∗σ˜(tk)∥∥∥+ bl )χσ˜(tk)
)
, (82)
χσ˜(tk) ,
∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)(I −BT (s))∥∥L1 l. (83)
With these definitions at hand, we now present the per-
formance of RHAC in the following theorem, whose proof
appears in Appendix F.
Theorem 5: Consider the real vehicle dynamics (31) con-
trolled by the L1-based RHAC comprised of (72), (73), (77),
(80) and (80), after t = tk∗ . If the minimum dwell time
satisfies (64) for reference (10) and satisfies (66) for reference
(11), e(tk∗) ∈ Θσ(tk∗ ), ε > 0, and
ε+ δ ≤ 1√
λmax(Pσ(tk))
, (84)
then e(t) ∈ Φσ(tk) and ‖x(t)− x¯(t)‖ ≤ ε, for any t ∈
[tk, tk+1), k ≥ k∗ ∈ N.
Remark 16: When physical or software failures or unfore-
seen environment influence lead to the triggering conditions
in the switching Rule I and/or II, RHAC will be activated
to prevent the state from further divergence. According to
Theorem 5, at the switching moment if the tracking error is
inside the safety envelope, the real state x(t) follows the state
x¯(t) of the vehicle model reference with a bias ε. Therefore,
x(t) always remains inside Ω by Lemma 2. As a consequence,
in light of Lemma 1, the real state x(t) never violates the safety
constraint (14).
VII. SIMULATION
This section focuses on demonstration of safe autonomous
velocity regulation via RHAC in dynamic normal driving
environments and an unforeseen environment. Following real
examples in [6], [11], [34], [37], the vehicle parameter values
used for simulation are given in Table II.
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Table II
VEHICLE PARAMETER VALUES
m J r ζ ̺ C rb ηb lr l
540kg 5kg-m2 0.31m 25Ns/m2 1Nms/rad 11.34cm2 124mm 0.38 1.14m 2.63m
A. Dynamic Normal Driving Environments
We assume the vehicle continuously drives between normal
snow and icy roads. Therefore, in the dynamic environments
we have
S/{hpc,learned} =
{
snow1, snow2, icy1, icy2
}
.
For the road friction models, we let ksnow = 70Nms/rad and
kicy = 35Nms/rad. For the angular references, we choose
w∗snow = 40rad/s and w
∗
icy = 20rad/s. The longitudinal
velocity references are computed via (12). For the state
bias, we let ε = 1.5. We set the slip safety boundaries as
µsnow = µicy = 1m/s. We let minimum dwell time on each
road be dwellmin = 30sec. By (19), we have
cˆsnow1 = [−0.5543, 1.7880]⊤, cˆsnow2 = [−0.5267, 1.6991]⊤,
cˆicy1 = [−0.5709, 0.6481]⊤, cˆicy2 = [−0.5152, 0.6243]⊤.
Then, by the formulae (59) and (60), the switching controller
matrices are solved by LMI toolbox as
Fsnow1 =
[
41.70 −128.6
−60.70 190.60
]
, Fsnow2=
[−14.40 23.20
25.30 −58.20
]
,
Ficy1 =
[
583.20 −1953.6
596.0 1995.1
]
, Ficy2 =
[−52.10 164.9
54.30 −172.2
]
.
For the uncertainties in (3), we set
f˜w(t) =
{
0.01v2(t) + 0.5 cos(t), snow road
0.05v(t) + 0.1 cos(v(t)), icy road
f˜v(t) =
{
0.05 sin(5w(t)) sin(t), snow road
0.5 sin(v(t)) sin(t), icy road.
In the simulation, we let the vehicle periodically drive
in two roads. The dwell times on the snow and icy roads
are respectively set as dwellsnow = 120sec and dwellicy =
150sec. With x(0) = [50rad/s, 16m/s]⊤, the trajectory of
velocities and slip are shown in Figure 7, from which we
observe that the developed L1-based RHAC succeeds in safe
autonomous velocity regulation in the dynamic adverse driving
environments.
B. Unforeseen Driving Environment
In the unforeseen driving environment, we assume that all
the environment relations and characteristics, e.g., viscous
torque (1), longitudinal aerodynamic drag force (2) and trac-
tion torque are unknown. In simulations, we set the previous
normal environmental parameter as kicy = 20Nms/rad, and
the uncertainties
f˜w(t)=0.005v
2(t)+0.5 cos(5t), f˜v(t)=0.05 sin(v(t)) sin(t),
others are as the same as those in previous subsection. We let
the vehicle enter the unforeseen environment at t = 120sec,
and we then change the uncertainties to
f˜w(t)=−0.3v2(t)+3 cos(5t), f˜v(t)=3 sin(v(t)) sin(t).
Figure 7. Vehicle and slip trajectories: velocities track the given references,
slips are constrained below the preset safety boundaries µsnow = µicy =
1m/s.
For model learning, we set the sampling period T =
0.0091sec and recorded data length κ = 0.1sec. For slip, we
set its safety boundary µicy = µlearned = 3m/s. For its safety
envelop defined in (26), we set θ = 0.35. As shown in Figure 8
(a), the learned model is activated at t = 121sec via real-time
verification of safety envelope. The learned system matrix is
Alearned =
[
4.3189 −14.7060
−0.1436 0.3929
]
.
The control matrix is then updated as
Flearned =
[ −58.9488 249.9351
52.8046 −226.7951
]
.
Figure 8. (a) Learned model is activated at t = 121sec by safety envelope
verification, (2) after the safe controller updated, wheel slip is constrained to
safe set.
The trajectory of slip in Figure 8 (b) and the trajectories
of velocities in Figure 9 show that using the learned vehicle
model reference (40), RHAC succeeds in regulating the ve-
locities to zeros while restricting the wheel slip to the safety
set in the unforeseen environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a model-learning based L1-
Simplex architecture for safe autonomous velocity regulation
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Figure 9. Vehicle velocity trajectories: after learned vehicle model is activated
at t = 121sec, velocities track the given references.
through integration of TCS and ABS. To make the L1-Simplex
more reliable, finite-time model learning is incorporated into
L1-based verified safe control, where the short-term state
data from a single trajectory generated in the unprepared or
unforeseen environments are used to adaptively update vehicle
model for reliable control actuation computation. Simulations
demonstrate the effectiveness of the L1-Simplex for longitu-
dinal vehicle control systems.
Exploring the model-learning based L1-Simplex in coordi-
nating lateral motion control and longitudinal motion control
of autonomous vehicles, as well as the demonstrations in full-
size car, constitute our future research direction.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Substituting (19) into (20) yields −1 ≤ ev
µσ−
ζr2vrσ
kσ
−
rew
µσ−
ζr2vrσ
kσ
≤ 1, which, in conjunction with the relation µσ ≥
ζr2vrσ
kσ
(indicated by (17)), leads to
−µσ + ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
≤ ev − rew ≤ µσ − ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
. (85)
It straightforwardly follows from µσ − ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
≤ µσ + ζr
2
v
r
σ
kσ
that (85) implies (17) and (18). Moreover, (17) and (18)
equivalently describe the safety condition (14) via the trans-
formations (15) and (16). Thus, (14) holds if (20) is satisfied.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For simplicity, let us denote
a11 ,
kσ
J
− ̺
J
− Fwσ1 , a12 ,
kσ
rJ
+ F vσ1 , a21 =
kσ
mr
, (86a)
a22 ,
kσ − ζr2
mr2
, b11 = −kσ
J
− ̺
J
− Fwσ2 , (86b)
b12 ,
kσ
rJ
− F vσ2 , b22 =
−kσ − ζr2
mr2
. (86c)
It is straightforward to verify from (51) and (52) that
det(λI − Âσ1) = 0 and det(λI − Âσ2) = 0 respectively
equate to λ2 − λ(a11 + a22) + a11a22 − a12a21 = 0 and
λ2−λ(b22 + b11)+b22b11−a21b12 = 0, which further implies
that Âσ1 and Âσ2 are Hurwitz if and only if
a11 + a22 < 0, a11a22 − a12a21 > 0, (87)
b11 + b22 < 0, b22b11 − a21b12 > 0. (88)
For Âσ1 , substituting the definitions of a11, a12, a21 and
a22 into (87) equivalently leads to (54). For Âσ2 , substituting
the definitions of b11, a21, b12 and b22 into (88) equivalently
leads to (55).
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In light of the definitions given in (86), the system matrices
(51) and (52) are rewritten as
Âσ1 =
[
a11 −a12
−a21 a22
]
, Âσ2 =
[
b11 b12
a21 b22
]
. (89)
To finish the proof, we only need to prove that there exist
feasible control gains Fwσ1 , F
w
σ2 , F
v
σ1 , F
v
σ2 , and P¯σ > 0 such
that (56) holds. Let us choose P¯σ =
[
pσ1 −1
−1 pσ2
]
> 0, by
which (56) and (89) lead
Â⊤σ1 P¯σ + P¯σÂσ1
=
[
2a11p
σ
1 + 2a21 −a22 − a11 − a21pσ2 − a12pσ1
∗ 2a22pσ2 + 2a12
]
,
Â⊤σ2 P¯σ + P¯σÂσ2
=
[
2b11p
σ
1 − 2a21 −b11 − b22 + a21pσ2 + b12pσ1
∗ −2b12 + 2b22pσ2
]
,
which, in conjunction with (86), leads to
(A⊤σ1 P¯σ+P¯σAσ1 )−(A⊤σ2P¯σ+P¯σAσ2 )=
[
k1 k2
k2 k3
]
, (90)
where
k1,
4kσp
σ
1
J
+
4kσ
mr
+ 2(Fwσ2 − Fwσ1 )pσ1 ,
k3,
4kσp
σ
2
mr2
+
4kσ
rJ
+ 2(F vσ1 − F vσ2 ),
k2,−2(1+rp
σ
2)kσ
mr2
− 2(r+p
σ
1)kσ
rJ
+(F vσ2−F vσ1)pσ1+Fwσ1−Fwσ2 .
Meanwhile, if k2 ≤ 0 and Fwσ2 = Fwσ1 , we have
k1 − |k2| = 4kσp
σ
1
J
+
4kσ
mr
− 2(1 + rp
σ
2 )kσ
mr2
− 2(r + p
σ
1 )kσ
rJ
+ (F vσ2 − F vσ1)pσ1 , (91)
k3 − |k2| = 4kσp
σ
2
mr2
− 2(1 + rp
σ
2 )kσ
mr2
+
4kσ
rJ
− 2(r + p
σ
1 )kσ
rJ
+ (F vσ2 − F vσ1 )(pσ1 − 2). (92)
With the consideration of (54) and (55), we can let Fwσ2 =
Fwσ1 , and choose a p
σ
2 > 0 such that k1 > 0, k3 > 0
and k2 ≤ 0. The second items in (54) and (55) imply that
if Fwσ2 = F
w
σ1 , we can have F
v
σ2 − F vσ1 > 0, which, in
conjunction with (91) and (92), indicate that given a fixed
pσ1 > 2, through adjustment of the magnitude of F
v
σ2 − F vσ1 ,
we have k1 > |k2| and k3 > |k2|. Therefore, we conclude
from (90) that Â⊤σ1 P¯σ+P¯σÂσ1 > Â
⊤
σ2 P¯σ + P¯σÂσ2 . Under
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(54), Âσ1 is Hurwitz, such that we can choose a P¯σ > 0
that Â⊤σ1 P¯σ + P¯σÂσ1 < 0. As a consequence, we have
Â⊤σ2 P¯σ + P¯σÂσ2 < 0.
To finish the proof, we should also consider P¯σ in the form
P¯σ =
[
pσ1 1
1 pσ2
]
. Following the same steps above, we get
the same conclusion (56).
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The formula (59) equivalently transforms to
P¯σ > 0, ∀σ ∈ U (93a)
cˆ⊤σ P¯
−1
σ cˆσ ≤ 1, ∀σ ∈ U (93b)
P¯σA¯σi + A¯
⊤
σi P¯σ < 0, ∀σ ∈ S, i = 1, 2 (93c)
P¯learnedA¯learned + A¯
⊤
learnedP¯learned < 0, (93d)
where A¯σi and A¯learned are given in (61). We now consider
the function:
Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) = e¯
⊤(t)P¯σ(t¯k)e¯(t), t ∈ [t¯k, t¯k+1), (94)
where t¯k denotes the switching times.
Following the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [38] we conclude
that if the conditions (93a), (93c), (93d) and (64) hold, we
have
V˙σ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) < 0, t ∈ [t¯k, t¯k+1), (95)
Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t¯k+1)) ≤ φVσ(tk−1)(e¯(t¯k)), ∀k ∈ N, (96)
where
0<φ= max
p6=q∈U
{edwellminλpmaxλ−1max(Pp)λmax(Pp)λ−1min(Pq)}<1.
We note that (95) and (96) indicate that Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) <
Vσ(t¯0)(e¯(t0)) for any t > t0 and ∀k ∈ N. Therefore, we
conclude that if e¯(t0) ∈ Θσ(t0), e¯(t) ∈ Θσ(t¯0) for any t ≥ t0.
As a consequence, e¯(t) ∈ Θ = ⋃
σ∈U
Θσ for any t ≥ t0.
With the consideration of (95) and (96), we can con-
struct a strictly decreasing sequence with respect to k:{
Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(tk)), k ∈ N
}
. The decreasing sequence straightfor-
wardly implies that the switched linear system is asymptoti-
cally stable.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Following the proof of Theorem 3, we also let t¯k denote
the switching time. The function (94) can still be used for the
dynamics (65). Noticing (93c) and definitions (62) and (63),
its time derivative satisfies
V˙σ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) ≤ λσ(t¯k)max e¯⊤(t)e(t)
= λσ(t¯k)max λ
−1
max(P¯σ(t¯k))λmax(P¯σ(t¯k))e¯
⊤(t)e¯(t)
≤ λσ(t¯k)max λ−1max(P¯σ(t¯k))Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) < 0, (97)
where the inequality (97) from previous step is obtained via
considering the fact λ
σ(t¯k)
max < 0.
It follows from (94), (65) and (97) that
Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(tk))
= e¯⊤(t¯−k )(E
⊤
k P¯σ(t¯k)Ek)e¯(t¯
−
k )
≤ λmax(E⊤k P¯σ(t¯k)Ek)e¯⊤(t¯−k )e¯(t¯−k )
≤ λmax(E
⊤
k P¯σ(t¯k)Ek)
λmin(P¯σ(t¯k−1))
Vσ(t¯k−1)(e¯(t¯
−
k ))
≤ λmax(E
⊤
k P¯σ(t¯k)Ek)
λmin(P¯σ(t¯k−1))
e
λ
σ(t¯k−1)
max (t¯k−t¯k−1)
λmax(P¯σ(t¯k−1)
)
Vσ(t¯k−1)(e¯(t¯k−1))
≤ νkVσ(t¯k−1)(e¯(t¯k−1)), (98)
where νk =
λmax(E
⊤
k P¯σ(t¯k)Ek)
λmin(P¯σ(t¯k−1))
e
λ
σ(t¯k−1)
max dwellmin
λmax(P¯σ(t¯k−1)
)
. We note that
the third inequality therein is obtained via the integration of
(97), while (98) from previous step is obtained via considering
λ
σ(t¯k−1)
max < 0 implied by (93c) and (93d).
The condition of dwellmin in Theorem 4 implies 0 < ν ,
min
k∈N
{νk} < 1 for ∀k ∈ N. Thus, we have
Vσ(t¯k)(e(t¯k)) < νVσ(t¯k−1)(e(t¯k−1)), (99)
by which we can construct a strictly decreasing sequence with
respect to k:
{
Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(tk)), k ∈ N
}
. The decreasing sequence
straightforwardly implies that the switched system (57) is
asymptotically stable.
We note that (95) still holds for this impulsive switched
system, thus, Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t¯k)) < Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) for any t > t¯k. We
obtain Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t)) < Vσ(t¯0)(e¯(t0)) for any t > t0 and ∀k ∈ N.
Therefore, we conclude that if e¯(t0) ∈ Θσ(t0), e¯(t) ∈ Θσ(t¯0)
for any t ≥ t0. As a consequence, x(t) ∈ Θ =
⋃
σ∈U
Θσ for
any t ≥ t0.
APPENDIX F: PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The proof follows the same procedure of Theorem 4.10 of
[25]. We thus only present the critical differences:
‖x(s)− x¯(s)‖L∞[tk,tk+1)
≤
∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)BT (s)(s+ α)∥∥L1
√
µ
K
+Mσ˜(tk), (100)
where
µ , 4ρ2 +
4αρ2 + 2ρl
α
(
1
1− e−2αdwellmin + 1
)
, (101)
Mσ˜(tk) ,
∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)(I−BT (s))∥∥L1∥∥∥f˘(t)(s)∥∥∥L∞[tk,tk+1).
(102)
For the considered velocity reference (11), (10) and (49),
further following (95) and (96) yields the same result as
e¯⊤(t)Pσ(t¯k)e¯(t)=Vσ(t¯k)(e¯(t))<Vσ(tk∗ )(e¯(tk∗))
=e¯⊤(tk∗)Pσ(tk∗ )e¯(tk∗),
(103)
for any t ∈ [t¯k, t¯k+1) with t¯k ≥ tk∗ , ∀k ∈ N.
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With the consideration of δ given by (81), the inequality
(103) implies
‖e¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1) < δ, k ≥ k∗ ∈ N. (104)
It follows from (68) that∥∥∥f˘q(s)∥∥∥
L∞[tk,tk+1)
≤ l‖x(s)‖L∞[tk,tk+1) + b, q = 0, 1
(105)
where l and b are given in (75).
Combining (102) with (104) and (105) yields
Mσ˜(tk)
≤ ∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)(I −BT (s))∥∥L1(l‖x(s)‖L∞[tk,tk+1) + b)
= χσ˜(tk)(‖x(s)‖L∞[tk,tk+1) +
b
l
)
≤ χσ˜(tk)(‖x− x¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1) + ‖x¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1) +
b
l
)
≤ χσ˜(tk)(‖x−x¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1)+‖e¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1)+
∥∥∥x∗σ˜(tk)∥∥∥+ bl ),
< χσ˜(tk)(‖x−x¯‖L∞[tk,tk+1)+δ+
∥∥∥x∗σ˜(tk)∥∥∥+ bl ), (106)
where χσ˜(tk) is given by (83).
Substituting (106) into (100) yields
(1− χσ˜(tk))‖x(s)− x¯(s)‖L∞[tk,tk+1)
<
∥∥Hσ˜(tk)(s)BT (s)(s+α)∥∥L1
√
µ
K
+χσ˜(tk)(δ+
∥∥∥x∗σ˜(tk)∥∥∥+ bl ),
which, in conjunction with ε > 0 (given in (82)), results in
‖x (t)− x¯ (t)‖ ≤ ε.
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